

How to increase cybercrime:

Stop cooperating with each other

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We bring cooperative strategies to fighting consumer cybercrime

- First we align on UWS requirements
- Then we provide/publish Deceptor and Certified feeds
- Security partners enforce when they agree

This talk evaluates the effects of non-cooperation

Deceptor



Software monetization is pervasive



- Consumers love free
- 90% of all installed apps are free
 - Free to try
 - Free with ads/offers
 - Freemium
- Most consumer AVs are software monetizers

Software monetizer funnel math

Example app costs with \$6K advertising spend CPC

| Step | Math | Counts | Calculated Cost | LTV Target to survive |
|-----------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Advertise | 4% click through rate on search ads | 600K see, 24K click | \$0.25 CPC | |
| Install | 50% accept, 50% install | 12K accept 6K install | \$1.00 CPI | \$2.00 |
| Convert | 5% convert to paid | 300 convert | \$20 cost to convert | \$40.00 |






What if a
monetizer
wants to make
even more?

If software monetizers
scare, trick, or cheat
consumers, they're
committing **cybercrime**

(We call their apps **Deceptors** and feed them to security partners)



Ways Deceptors commit cybercrime

| Monetization Goal | Cybercrime |
|--|---|
| Traffic: Spend money to get consumers to see your “free” offer | Scary ads, false representation, malicious suppliers and affiliates |
| Distribute: Get installed, then stay as long as possible | Irresistible offers, fear at uninstall, stealth, hardening |
| Monetize: Search, ads, bundles, upsells, call centers, resource “borrowing” | False sense of urgency, PII and resource theft, price gouging, threats, install malware |



Deceptors breed more Deceptors

- Deceptors earn more, so they out-bid competitors for even more traffic
- Competitors now face higher advertising costs, so they become Deceptors; a vicious, infectious cycle



AVs to the rescue?

Based on market coverage




* Until AV blocking coverage approaches 50%, Deceptors can afford to hurt consumers

| Step | Counts / Cost | 5% | 20% | 50% * | 75% | 90% |
|-----------|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Advertise | 24K click / \$0.25 CPC | | | | | |
| Install | 6K install / \$1.00 CPI | 5,700 / \$1.05 | 4,800 / \$1.25 | 3,000 / \$2.00 | 1,500 / \$4.00 | 600 / \$10 |
| Convert | 300 convert / \$20 cost to convert | 285 / \$21 | 240 / \$25 | 150 / \$40 | 75 / \$80 | 30 / \$200 |
| Response | | Ignore | Evade | Choose a path | Comply | Comply |

Analyzing Deceptor persistence

| | Told app, didn't list n=48 | Listed as Deceptor n=170 |
|--------------------|--|--|
| App Fixes/Dies | 58% | 95% |
| App Remains Active | 42% | 5% |

- We measured what would happen if we didn't help coordinate
- All active Deceptors had <30% AV blocking



A better world: certified apps

- Certified apps promise to not violate any UwS or PUA requirements
- This puts a 33% hit on their business (they trade it for sustainability)
- We want AVs to encourage certification by
 - Providing actionable reasons if they're still detecting them
 - Creating a level playing field so they can thrive (detect Deceptors)



Certified app blocking encourages deception

| Step | Counts / Cost | Clean cost of certification | 5% detect | 20% detect* |
|-----------|--|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Advertise | 24K click / \$0.25 CPC | \$0.25 | \$0.25 | \$0.25 |
| Install | 6K install / \$1.00 CPI | 4,000 / \$1.50 | 3,800 / \$1.58 | 3,200 / \$1.88 |
| Convert | 300 convert / \$20 cost to convert | 200 / \$30 | 190 / \$32 | 160 / \$38 |
| Response | | Hope | Worry | Panic, quit |

* When AV blocking coverage approached 20%, half of the Certified apps reverted to Deceptors, increasing cybercrime





We're enlisting more Dynamic Security Ecosystem partners

| Block point | Deceptor Blocking Partner |
|------------------------|--|
| Installs | AVs (key player) |
| Ads, offers, downloads | Browser safety, firewalls |
| Listings | Download sites, app stores |
| Money | Payment gateways, call centers, bundlers, affiliates |

The more blocking partners involved, the better chance we have to stop cybercrime and encourage good software monetizer behavior

Reasons we've heard against cooperating



| Reason | Our Response |
|---|--|
| We refuse to tell apps why we detect them | The prevalence of UwS proves this strategy fails. Why not give Certified apps a chance to fix? |
| Certified apps have no redeeming value, so I will keep detecting them as PUA | Can you make this claim without being hypocritical? |
| We will never trust a Certified app; they're just finding other ways to cheat | If we find Certified apps hurting consumers, we'll revoke their certification |
| We don't think your requirements are strict enough | Please help us fix what we're missing. |
| We can't detect our business partners | Find new business partners, or encourage yours to start behaving |

Rewarding cooperation

- We'll explain to consumers why they're safer with participating AVs. (PR and tests)
- We'll support certified apps we find are unreasonably targeted by AVs (invalid, non-actionable, or non-shared reasons)



A call to cooperate

- You may think you can protect your customers by working alone
- But we've shown that working alone increases consumer cybercrime
- The best way to protect your customers is to work together
 - Block Deceptors as fast as possible
 - Encourage proper behavior of Certified apps
 - Help monitor for misbehavior
 - Help advance UwS requirements

